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Conditional Cash Transfer programs are the popular government welfare paradigm of the new millennium, the 
main objectives of which are to lower poverty levels in the short term by distributing cash, as well as to decrease 
poverty in the long term by incentivizing program participants to build the human capital necessary to support 
themselves without program benefits. Though these programs are not a singular answer to the eradication of 
poverty, they are praised as innovative and necessary tools of welfare. Their popularity and relative novelty 
have captivated the attention of both academics and practitioners, and as a result, their effects are widely 
studied. Specifically, their effects on improving health, education and social outcomes are thoroughly 
documented. 
A key element is missing, however, in the ongoing effort to evaluate these programs. Evaluations that discuss 
the programs’ outcome potentials in the long run must show that poverty levels in countries where these 
programs have been implemented sustainably decrease. Using generalized poverty data from the World Bank as 
well as figures for Brazil’s CCT program, Bolsa Família, this analysis uses time-series methods to show that 
while levels of poverty have decreased in countries implementing CCT programs, there is little evidence that 
CCT programs promise to be as effective in combating poverty in the long term as many would like to believe. 
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1 Introduction 
With the transition into the millennium well underway, the conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
model for welfare programs that emerged in the late 90’s has begun to spread from its cradle 
in Latin America to the rest of the world (Figure 1). In 1997 three such programs existed 
around the world in Brazil, Mexico and Bangladesh (Bolsa Escola, Progresa and Food-for-
Education, respectively1). Today, virtually all countries in Latin America and various others 
around the world have implemented CCT programs, and many others are in pilot or 
discussion stages of deploying some variant of a conditional cash transfer scheme as a measure 
against poverty (ILO 2009). 
Figure 1 — CCT Programs in the World 
 
                                     
1 Although some countries had anti-poverty schemes at this time they were not, strictly speaking, CCT 
programs. 
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These programs are continually evaluated, both by the program administrators who have a 
vested interest in the programs’ success as well as by third party organizations such as the 
World Bank, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and other institutions 
with an interest2 in the programs (Attanasio et al. 2005; Britto 2005). While the results of 
existing studies generally point to successful outcomes3, if we are to acknowledge these claims 
by continuing to expand the programs, we should have a better idea of what they can 
reasonably deliver. Because of their explicit mandates we should not expect that programs 
will be funded solely for their tendency to improve poverty related metrics4. It may not even 
suffice to prove that poverty levels decrease with the implementation of a CCT program. 
Instead, evaluations that strive to demonstrate the effectiveness of CCT programs must show 
that not only are CCT programs associated with a decrease in the immediate levels of 
poverty, but also with an increasingly negative rate of change in poverty levels. 
                                     
2 The scope of these interests spans a broad range, from investments and publicity to replication, innovation or 
humanitarian philanthropy to just pure scholarship. 
3 Examples of indicators that most studies use to show successful outcomes include school enrollment rates, 
progression to secondary education, visits to primary care facilities for preventive health services, infant 
mortality and vaccinations (UNDP 2009; Schultz 2004; Attanasio et al. 2005). 
4 Such as increasing school enrollment or for reducing infant mortality rates (Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007; 
Schultz 2004; UNDP 2009; Grosh et al. 2008). 
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CCT Program Overview 
CCT programs distribute cash to eligible and registered beneficiary families as long as the 
participants continue to meet conditions designed to promote social interests falling under the 
term human capital (François Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite 2003; Fiszbein et al. 2009; 
Rawlings 2004). Eligibility is usually defined by the number of children a family has below a 
certain age threshold and whether the combined family income falls below a certain poverty 
line. The programs are designed to promote qualities and characteristics in its citizens — 
their human capital — that are generally believed to lead to healthier societies. For example, 
these include keeping children enrolled in school and properly vaccinated, as well as providing 
evidence of regular preventive health care (Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld 2009; Fiszbein et al. 
2009). Programs see these principles to implementation differently, with some putting more 
emphasis on educational measures such as high enrollment figures, while others focus more on 
child nutrition, or family consumption (Attanasio et al. 2005; Attanasio et al. 2008; Rawlings 
and Rubio 2005; Freije et al. 2006). 
In contrast, traditional directed government welfare provides a specific kind of aid to the 
poor. Medicaid, for example, provides the poor with a means to obtain health care while rice 
subsidies provide the poor with a means to obtain food. Such programs provide no options for 
the poor to restructure their lives, and if the benefits do not suit the specific needs of the 
beneficiaries, the program provides no relief for them. The beneficiary may not, for example, 
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be able to find transport to a Medicaid clinic. Likewise the price of rice may increase. 
Additionally, non-CCT programs may provide immediate relief, but they fail to address 
poverty in the long term. Food stamps or rice subsidies, for example, provide immediate relief 
to the poor with the purchasing power to buy food, but short of continuing to provide benefit, 
do little to eradicate the generational transmission of poverty. 
Cash transfer programs, on the other hand, provide cash directly to the beneficiaries to 
alleviate immediate burdens of poverty5. Conditional cash transfer programs go one step 
further, taking measures to encourage forward-thinking decisions (Rawlings 2004). Common 
across every variation of CCT program are the conditions that beneficiaries6 enroll their 
children in school as well as maintain a regular schedule of health check-ups, as these are 
widely held to be the most critical factors of sustainable poverty decrease (McKee and Todd 
2011). Ultimately the aim is to build up future generations’ levels of human capital and 
earnings potential and in a sense, these programs ask for a return on society’s investment, 
providing an incentive (or a mandate, if enforced) for beneficiaries to do their part in 
alleviating poverty from society in the future. CCT programs posit that as beneficiaries leave 
                                     
5 These direct cash transfers are made with the expectation that people will make the best spending & investing 
decisions for themselves (François Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite 2002). 
6 Many programs, such as Bolsa Família in Brazil, make the matriarch of the household (when one is available) 
the primary beneficiary. This has the added function of elevating the status of women within a society, as well 
as giving poor men — who tend to be more disconnected from the family unit — an incentive to remain 
attached to the family structure, if only to reap the rewards (Attanasio and Mesnard 2006). 
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the program, they should be better fitted with the tools necessary to lift themselves out of the 
cycle of poverty and into the middle class (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Grosh et al. 2008; Rawlings 
and Rubio 2005; MDS 2012). 
CCT Programs in the World 
Although CCT programs have had successes in regions with widespread and extreme poverty, 
they are commonly deployed in developing as well as developed nations (Handa and Davis 
2006; UNDP 2009). First pioneered in Mexico and Brazil, the countries’ respective CCT 
programs, Oportunidades and Bolsa Família, continue to lead the world in program scope, 
reach and evaluation results (Lindert et al. 2007). Other developing countries such as China 
and India have pilot programs that continue to adjust and expand. Even in the United 
States, the city of New York developed Opportunity NYC7 to lessen immediate income-related 
hardships for low-income families through cash transfers as well as to encourage and help low-
income families to increase and sustain positive efforts to improve their futures by investing 
in their children (ONYC 2012). 
The popularity of CCT programs in recent years is easy to see, when even the media response 
to them is a topic of study (Lindert and Vincensini 2008). As the hot ticket item in social 
welfare policy, CCT programs have a broad base of support, their successes the subject of 
                                     
7 ONYC was modeled after Brazil’s Bolsa Família program. 
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much optimistic reporting that is widely disseminated by the media (Britto 2005; UNDP 
2009). Compared to other social welfare programs such as unconditional cash transfers (or 
near-cash transfer such as food), general subsidies, workfare or fee-waiver programs8, CCT 
programs are flexible and well-studied in concept, as well as efficient and transparent in their 
implementations, focused on the future with a clear set of goals (Rawlings and Rubio 2005). 
It’s also easy to understand why the programs have such levels of support given that they 
provide what the public and its politicians want. The poor get a program that provides cash 
directly in their hands, while the taxpayer is appeased with the conditions that the program 
requires of its beneficiaries, as well as being reassured of the program’s positive effects from 
the successful metrics of the myriad existing studies. Politicians, in the meantime, are given 
the opportunity to fund an already popular program that will provide renewable support at a 
low cost of implementation (Fiszbein et al. 2009). Still, popularity today does not equate to 
evidence of success in achieving long term goals. 
Nor is it any surprise that CCT programs are so widely studied. Given the relative novelty 
and reported success of the programs in places like Brazil and Mexico, it makes sense that 
governments interested in deploying similar programs take a keen interest in the outcome of 
existing programs (UNDP 2009). As the largest and most popular programs, Brazil’s Bolsa 
                                     
8 Examples of non-CCT programs include Medicaid in the United States, as well as food stamps and rice 
subsidies around the world. 
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Família and Mexico’s Oportunidades are particularly well-studied (Britto 2005; Dammert 
2009; Rawlings and Rubio 2005). And while the literature on CCT programs and program 
evaluations is pervasive today, Cardoso and Souza noted in 2004 that few ex-post studies 
existed for CCT programs in Brazil (Cardoso and Souza 2004). In 2003, however, the popular 
and reportedly successful municipal CCT programs in Brazil9 were merged into Bolsa 
Família, Brazil’s popular flagship program (Caixa Economica Federal 2012; World Bank 
2012). The resounding reports of the successes of the Brazilian program in improving social 
welfare indicators — such as school enrollment and preventive care given to children — 
opened the proverbial floodgates. By 2005 the number of studies, outcome analyses and 
evaluations of CCT programs had greatly increased (Lindert and Vincensini 2008), and 
funding was more widely available for new initiatives (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Grindle and 
Thomas 1991; Britto 2005). Given the sizable funding opportunities at stake and the relative 
size of CCT programs (Johannsen 2009), these programs naturally began drawing the 
attention of evaluators, particularly the larger ones, like Bolsa Família10, which by 2011 
reached 11.1 million people, almost 25% of the country’s population (Lindert et al. 2007) 
                                     
9 The benefits distributed by Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação, Cartão Alimentação and Auxílio-Gás were 
integrated and exclusively distributed by Bolsa Família (Caixa Economica Federal 2012). 
10 Brazil’s Bolsa Família reached 11.1 million people in 2011, almost 25% of the country’s population (Lindert et 
al. 2007). 
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Addressing Poverty 
Poverty is a multi-faceted phenomenon, with many causes, effects and — hopefully — 
solutions. A study of poverty, therefore, requires clarity concerning definitions and terms. 
According to the World Bank, poverty can be broken down into three categories11: resource 
poverty, inequality and vulnerability to poverty in the future (World Bank 2012). Issues 
pertaining to the measurement of poverty across these categories are important considerations 
when selecting data. Because I use poverty data provided by the World Bank12, these 
dimensions of classifying poverty are already accounted for in the figures (World Bank Data 
2012). 
In order to measure poverty directly, I quantify and label it across countries by using the 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT13) family of indices, which is used to quantify poverty in 
several other studies of note (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Grosh et al. 2008; Freije et al. 2006; UNDP 
2009). A relatively simple trio of poverty metrics, it requires no control group as it relies on a 
                                     
11 Resource poverty, which is defined as not having enough resources or abilities today to meet a person’s needs 
is the primary form of poverty considered in most studies. Inequality is usually measured by the Gini Coefficient 
and vulnerability is defined as the probability today of being in or falling deeper into poverty in the future 
(World Bank 2012). 
12 World Bank data is based on primary household surveys distributed by various third-party agencies as well as 
government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments (World Bank Data 2012) 
13 The general form of the FGT index is given by 𝐹𝐺𝑇 = !! ∙ (!!!!! )!!!!!  where N is the population, H is the 
number of poor, z is the poverty line, yi are individual incomes and α is a sensitivity parameter. If α is low the 
FGT metric weights all the individuals with incomes below z roughly the same. If it is high, those with the 
lowest incomes (farthest below z) are given more weight in the measure (Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984). 
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fixed poverty line (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984). Although the 
World Bank uses an international poverty line of purchasing power parity (PPP) $1/day to 
categorize extreme poverty, in this study I select the poverty line at PPP $2/day because it is 
more relevant to lower-middle income countries such as Brazil, which is the country of focus 
in this study (Ravallion 2008). The higher the FGT statistic, the more poverty there is in an 
economy. A breakdown of the three components of the FGT family is discussed in the 
appendix. 
Objective & Hypothesis 
Few studies of CCT program outcomes have addressed poverty outcomes directly, even 
though the main goals of CCT programs are to alleviate poverty in the short and long term 
(MDS 2012; Caixa Economica Federal 2012; Fiszbein et al. 2009; Grosh et al. 2008; Rawlings 
2004). As such, no clear answer has yet emerged to address the question of whether CCT 
programs are achieving these goals (Grosh et al. 2008). Using macroeconomic data to observe 
the rates of change in poverty levels I show that CCT programs are associated with a 
sustainable decrease in poverty levels. 
Certainly these programs will have helped people overcome real obstacles and improved the 
lives of beneficiaries. CCT programs have been attributed with increased participation in the 
political process as well as drops in income inequality (Gledhill and Hita 2009) and other 
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studies show that CCT programs have had a clear effect on height-for-age14 (McKee and 
Todd 2011; Gladwell 2008). Studies also show that CCT programs have an impact on 
increasing school enrollment (Schultz 2004; Cardoso and Souza 2004). However, Bourguignon, 
Ferreira & Leite (2002) show that while Bolsa Família had an impact on school enrollment 
numbers in Brazil, there was no correlation with a decrease in child labor statistics or an 
increase in school attendance, implying that human capital might not be increasing as the 
programs intend. Taken together, these data suggest that there may be a gap between what 
the programs are meant to do and what they are, in fact, doing. 
Given these indicators and how the issue of poverty in particular has not yet been explicitly 
addressed, in this study I address the issue of whether the implementation of CCT programs 
is associated with a decrease in poverty levels. I conduct a difference-in-difference analysis of 
the poverty levels in Brazil from 1980 to 2011 to provide evidence that there exists a 
difference in the rate of change of poverty levels before and during the different stages of the 
Bolsa Família CCT program, showing explicitly that the rate of change has been increasingly 
negative. The results of this analysis are compared to a similar analysis of other countries 
with and without CCT programs to validate the trend.  
                                     
14 Which, curiously, is known to be a potential indicator for future earnings. 
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2 Literature Review 
Although the existing literature examining CCT program outcomes and impacts contains 
significant evidence to support an improvement across many indicators of social welfare, few 
studies reach any conclusion about the association of CCT programs with poverty reduction. 
Data quality is certainly an issue — gathering poverty data is inherently difficult and costly 
(World Bank Data 2012). Moreover, though some program participants have already exited 
the program, CCT programs as a concept have been around for little more than a decade 
(Caixa Economica Federal 2012). What this means is that measuring rates of change in 
poverty levels through the observation of proxy variables (such as education and health) is 
inefficient and unlikely to yield results (Wooldridge 2009). A study of Bolsa Família’s impact 
on Education and Labor performed by academics at the Federal University in Minas Gerais 
— as one of many examples — used data from the initial Impact Evaluation of Bolsa Família 
(AIBF) survey from 2005, only two years after the program’s inception in 2003 (Oliveira et 
al. 2007). Oliveira herself recognizes that the quantity of data available at that time was 
insufficient to satisfactorily perform time-series analysis, and casts doubt on the validity of 
the claims. 
Regardless of whether due to data quality or availability, studies of CCT programs have 
tended to focus on social welfare metrics directly than on explicit poverty. Attanasio’s 
evaluation of Colombia’s Familias en Acción, for example, asserts the program’s effectiveness 
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in increasing consumption within households and highlights other promising figures 
concerning educational enrollment and vaccination rates, without referring to the general 
levels of poverty (Attanasio et al. 2005). Similarly, Fernald’s assessment of Oportunidades 
reiterates the claims of the program’s success in Mexico but does not include a metric of 
poverty in the study (Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld 2009). In another example of this 
treatment of social welfare indicators over poverty metrics, in different papers Rawlings 
thoroughly asserts the impacts of CCT programs on social welfare metrics including 
education, health and consumption, but for various reasons including data quality and 
availability, falls short of being able to conclude anything about the programs’ explicit 
impacts on poverty (Rawlings 2004; Rawlings and Rubio 2005). It is important to question 
whether this pattern of failing to address poverty directly merits concern because although 
the programs are clearly having a positive impact on something, the allocation of resources is 
always an important consideration (Mankiw 2010). 
An increase in the metrics of overall social welfare is not necessarily correlated with a 
decrease in poverty levels in the long run. While research shows that patterns of consumption 
by the poor have changed in countries with CCT programs, and that recipients of benefits are 
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spending more on the education and well-being of their children15, this metric alone says 
nothing of the social capital being built by the beneficiaries, and therefore we do not learn 
anything about the sustainability of the poverty reduction created by the programs. 
Similarly, though there is evidence of increases in the use of preventive health services and 
school enrollment (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2009), changes in these indicators — positive as 
they may seem for social development — are not necessarily evidence of decreasing poverty. 
Health and education improvements must be complemented by supply-side interventions in 
order to ensure real gains in human capital development (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2009). And 
while the effects of CCT programs seem to clearly increase the demand-side pressure on these 
services, conclusive evidence that this pressure has resulted in the necessary supply-side 
improvements to continue the capital construction has not yet emerged (Grosh et al. 2008). 
Evaluating Apples & Oranges 
CCT programs share the fundamental idea that cash given to the poor can be an investment 
in building the human capital of society. However, the implementations of programs across 
different countries, populations, geographies and political constructs are far from identical, 
and measuring how one program compares to another is not straightforward (Fiszbein et al. 
2009). Even in Latin America, economic, social, political and geographic differences preclude a 
                                     
15 The metric accounts for increased spending on children’s clothes and higher quality food while ensuring that 
there is not an increase in adult consumables such as alcohol, tobacco or adult clothing (Attanasio and Mesnard 
2006). 
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homogeneous take on the design and deployment of a country’s CCT program. In Peru and 
Bolivia, for example, targeting and delivery methods needed to be modified in order to 
account for poor populations in difficult mountainous terrain not easily reached nor often 
traversed (Borraz and González 2009). The authors note that this change in deployment 
methods had an observable effect on the measured impact a few years later when the 
Uruguayan program evaluators tried to compare their results with the Peruvian and Bolivian 
findings and found too many inconsistencies and deviations from expected values. The 
targeting conditions and methods used in Peru and Bolivia turned out to be too different for 
the results to be fairly compared with their own, which took into account the reasonably low-
altitude and homogeneous terrain of Uruguay. 
Program evaluators must also be aware of the wording used when relying on surveys, 
interviews or other qualitative methods of evaluation. Social perspectives can differ drastically 
between neighboring countries such as Brazil and Argentina (and even within them)16. 
Between countries of differing fiscal and social leanings there will be different perspectives on 
the value of the conditions of a CCT program and therefore on how they will internalize their 
social responsibility. Lindert and Vincensini note that politically left-leaning countries see the 
conditions as merely emphasizing citizen’s rights and responsibilities whereas more right-
                                     
16 Despite their similarities in certain measures, Brazil and Argentina are quite different in others. Brazil’s 
poverty headcount ratios have often been anywhere from 2 to 20 times that of Argentina, with a Gini coefficient 
10 to 20 points higher (World Bank Data 2012). 
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leaning countries see them as enforceable contracts between beneficiaries and the tax-paying 
public (Fiszbein et al. 2009; Lindert and Vincensini 2008). Since voters are not utility-
maximizing game-theorists, and are even less so in more left-leaning countries than in right-
leaning ones (Britto 2005), their study finds that public support for CCT programs changes 
depending on the most politically palatable language used when referring to the conditions. 
An electorate that sees government as its agent and welfare as a social responsibility to its 
underclass might more easily support a program that is labeled with co-responsibilities. 
On the other hand, in a society that views government as authority, groups receiving benefits 
may understand and more reliably comply with a program where the tradeoff is labeled as a 
condition (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2009). A study in Kenya, for instance, found that even 
though the incidence of malaria decreased when households were provided mosquito nets 
treated with insecticide, when asked about what they would do given an equivalent amount 
of cash, households responded that they would have spent the aid on different priorities such 
as food and clothing, showing little import to the idea of a social responsibility to help 
prevent an epidemic (Das, Do et al. 2005). Conversely, in Brazil, a country whose government 
and media engages in pervasive campaigns to increase people’s awareness of their citizenship 
and contributions and effects within the society17, interviews with program participants 
                                     
17 For example, by means of common acts of citizenship such as not throwing trash on the street, being 
courteous to the elderly and so forth. 
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indicate they are proud to be able to keep their children vaccinated and enrolled in school 
and still be able to afford food and housing for their families (Caixa Economica Federal 2012; 
MDS 2012). 
Generalizing results of studies like these is difficult, of course, because many CCT programs 
are designed with emphasis on different aspects of human capital construction (Rawlings and 
Rubio 2005). Colombia’s Familias en Acción program focused on improving patterns of 
consumption among the poor (Attanasio and Mesnard 2006) while Oportunidades in Mexico 
had a strong education-centric component (Schultz 2004). Even though these programs share 
the goals of reducing poverty in the short and long term, when governments deploy them 
across different types of environments to people with different cultures and values 
experiencing different types of poverty, it is reasonable to expect that the implementations 
and outcomes will differ in meaningful ways. Evaluating program successes based on 
comparisons of social welfare indicators that are difficult to measure or translate from one 
program to another complicates the task. Rather than measure the success of a program 
based on how it compares to that of another country’s, it is preferable to measure the results 
in a country using a measure that can be directly compared, such as the percentage decrease 
in that country’s rate of change in poverty over time. 
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Poverty Metrics 
Because they are the most easily understood and widely reported, I will focus on the two 
elements of the FGT18 index that are most relevant to resource poverty — namely, when α=0 
and when α=1 (Fiszbein et al. 2009; McKee and Todd 2011; Grosh et al. 2008; World Bank 
2012). Respectively, the FGT0 and the FGT1 represent the poverty headcount ratio (or the 
proportion of a population considered to be poor) and the poverty gap (a measure of the 
depth of poverty). Drops in either of these figures indicate a decrease in the levels of poverty 
(Fiszbein et al. 2009; Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984). The other dimensions of the FGT 
index are not necessary for this study, as they would add an unnecessary element of 
complexity. 
Another reason to focus on the poverty 
headcount ratio and the poverty gap is that, 
as metrics, they directly encompass the top 
and bottom limits of poverty (Figure 2). 
Following this line of thinking, the headcount 
ratio can be conceptualized as the top limit of 
poverty within a population based on the 
                                     
18 For a more detailed explanation of the FGT statistical index, see the appendix. 
Population By Income
Population Above the Poverty
Line
Population Below the Poverty
Line
Figure 2 
Population By Income 
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poverty line, while the poverty gap — or the depth of poverty — can be conceptualized as 
the bottom limit of this population. Reducing the metric for the poverty headcount ratio is 
equivalent to lowering this top line (lowering the percentage of people who fall below the 
poverty line), while reducing the metric for the depth of poverty is equivalent to raising the 
bottom line (making poor people less poor means that the poverty level in the country only 
goes so deep). 
Measuring Levels of Poverty 
Whether levels of poverty should be measured using poverty lines or shifts in the distribution 
of consumption is not entirely without debate. It possible to see the effects of a CCT program 
on the poverty level within a country without referring to a specific line of poverty by 
comparing the cumulative distribution of consumption per capita between treatment and 
control populations across different ranges of income (Freije et al. 2006; World Bank 2012; 
Attanasio and Mesnard 2006). The RPS in Nicaragua, for example, showed distributions for 
treated households that were clearly higher than those for the control group, indicating a 
positive impact on the poverty rate. Ecuador showed a similar measure proportional to the 
size of the transfers (Fiszbein, Schady et al. 2009).  
Furthermore, the selection of the poverty line is, itself, a hotly discussed topic. Not only have 
some countries failed to establish a national poverty line (Britto 2005), there are also those 
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who consider it too arbitrary a measure of poverty (Pogge and Reddy 2005). Pogge and 
Reddy’s 2005 article argues that the World Bank’s international poverty line is not 
adequately anchored in a specification of the real requirements of human beings, and that the 
concept of purchasing power that it employs is not well-defined. However, Pogge and Reddy 
focus on required nutritional cut-offs, which do not vary much from country to country. They 
also fail to account for how there are different ways in which different standards of living can 
reach the caloric minimum to survive, and how this same phenomenon is reflected in poverty 
lines. Interestingly, the proposed alternative is to construct a different set of poverty lines, 
essentially a more bureaucratic version of the same national poverty lines opposed in their 
study (Ravallion 2008).  
Though the debate concerning poverty lines continues, poverty lines remain the most widely 
accepted means of measuring poverty (World Bank 2012; Ravallion et al. 1991; Ravallion 
1992; Ravallion 2008). A simulations-based approach using poverty lines to define poverty 
shows that Mexico’s Oportunidades can be associated with up to a third of the reduction in 
rural poverty in Mexico between 1998 and 2002, in part because of increases in education 
spending (Freije, Bando et al. 2007). In another example of how poverty lines are a 
prominent means of measuring poverty, Gledhill and Hita cite that between April 2004 and 
March 2009, 4.8 million Brazilians moved above the poverty line, reducing the proportion of 
poor people in the six principal metropolitan regions of Brazil by more than 28%, from 42.7% 
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to 30.7% (Gledhill and Hita 2009; IPEA 2009). Many other studies use the poverty line as a 
way to measure poverty, and particularly changes in poverty. Among the most prominent 
and well-respected study in the field, one in particular uses poverty lines and an index to 
assess changes in poverty levels over time (Aber 2012). 
Based largely on self-compiled survey data that includes treatment and control groups with 
baselines for participants19, Fiszbein et al. use the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family of 
poverty measures to regress levels of poverty by households in Colombia, Mexico, Nicaragua 
and Honduras across a period of two to four years from 1998 to 2006 (Fiszbein et al. 2009). 
The study finds that families participating in CCT programs reduced their levels of poverty 
by a statistically significant amount, while families in the control group remained constant 
(Fiszbein et al. 2009). Bourguignon argues that such poverty indices are a half-measure for 
poverty, that it underestimates real levels (François Bourguignon and Chakravarty 2003). 
The paper argues instead that true-multidimensional measurements would take the various 
dimensions of poverty and apply individual poverty lines to each one. I find the notion 
intriguing, and admit that it certainly is more granular a measure of poverty, and 
proportionally more accurate. However, for my part it is an academic discussion20 — the 
                                     
19 The data has some limitations including having some regressions controlling for other correlates, some data 
existing for one year only while others exist for a range of years and in some cases, from the survey being given 
out too soon after the start of the program (Fiszbein et al. 2009). 
20 I will admit the pun only in a footnote. All discussions in a master’s thesis are academic. 
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nature of the metric is one and the same, and since my data comes from the World Bank, 
which remains a strong advocate for international poverty lines and the FGT, this is the 
metric I use in the study. 
Although there is other evidence in other studies for this sort of change in the immediate 
levels of poverty after the implementation of a CCT program, the distinct effects on the levels 
of poverty and its fluctuations over time are not clear. For starters, aggregate information 
concerning the size of the program and its scope must be accounted for, lest the comparison 
confound program spending with household consumption (Borraz and González 2009). 
Furthermore, the assumption that higher educational attainment translates into higher 
earnings in the long term should not be made lightly since it is mediated by the quality of the 
education and health services received (Fiszbein et al. 2009). Similarly, increased rates of 
employment, efficient absorption of skilled labor in the economic structure and an improved 
general rate of return to education depend greatly on factors outside the sphere of influence of 
any CCT program (Bourgvignon, Ferreira et al. 2002; Britto 2005). 
Measuring Change in Poverty 
In addressing whether CCT programs can meet their objectives of decreasing poverty levels in 
both the short and long term, I direct my attention to how poverty changes over time 
(McKee and Todd 2011). In so doing, I distinguish between the short and long term for the 
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purposes of determining the immediate impacts of a CCT program. In the early stages of a 
CCT program, the cash transfers distributed to beneficiaries will clearly result in fluctuations 
in the incomes of participants as a result of the additional income from the program21. These 
fluctuations will, in turn, appear as disturbances in the immediate levels of poverty of 
participants. It will also disturb the country’s poverty levels if the participants comprise a 
significant enough ratio of the overall population (McKee and Todd 2011). Other studies 
show that the second two years of a CCT program may have different kinds of impacts as the 
programs adjust or expand (Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007; Freije et al. 2006; Gledhill and 
Hita 2009). This intermediate phase of a CCT program has not been as well-studied at this 
point since many CCT programs are still in the early stages. However, a few programs are 
beyond their three-year mark and patterns from these data can be mined and examined. 
In the context of this study, the long term refers to the time when participants exit the 
program and cease to receive benefits. Whether because a growing child no longer meets the 
age requirements or whether the family no longer falls below the poverty line to be eligible to 
receive benefits, exiting the program reclassifies people as post-program beneficiaries. While 
there may be some expected value of time that constitutes the long term, there is no reason 
                                     
21 It should be noted that the costs of receiving this income might result in no fluctuation in the poverty level, or 
even a slight increase. If a child who would otherwise be working, for example, needed to be in school in order 
for the family to receive benefits, this could reduce the family’s overall income (François Bourguignon, Ferreira, 
and Leite 2002). 
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to consider it explicitly. Over time, the former beneficiary — who had ostensibly been 
building human capital while enrolled — should experience a higher income potential and 
therefore a lower incidence of poverty than would otherwise be expected had they not been 
enrolled in the program at all. As more people exit the program over time, the rate of change 
in the poverty levels should continue to decrease if the program is having the desired effect of 
reducing future levels of poverty. 
Measuring Long term Poverty Reduction 
Readings of the long-term reduction in poverty are less well defined in the literature. Scores 
of evaluations have revealed little about which element of the intervention is responsible for 
the observed changes or whether the relatively short term changes will be translated into long 
term impacts on human capital development and as a result, poverty (Rawlings and Rubio 
2005). However, McKee and Todd (2009) are able to demonstrate important aspects about 
how the incentives contribute to building human capital. Using methods originally proposed 
by Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux in 1996, McKee and Todd simulate earnings distributions in 
order to demonstrate impacts on long-term poverty from survey data in Mexico, both 
experimental and non-experimental in nature. The study uses non-parametric methods to 
consider how the program’s impact on human capital will affect future earnings, linking the 
development of human capital directly to a corresponding reduction in poverty. Using non-
parametric evaluation designs and various measures of poverty and inequality, McKee and 
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Todd are able to conclude that Oportunidades will increase future mean earnings, but that it 
will only have modest effects on poverty levels. Though the dataset spans only the first two 
years of the program (1998-1999), only considers rural areas (506 villages), and only analyzes 
Oportunidades in Mexico, the experimental results are able to demonstrate statistically 
significant program impacts on developing human capital. Like other simulation-based 
studies, this does not demonstrate the long-term effects of CCT programs based on a real 
world prior. 
Another approach would be to measure the change in the poverty rate for individuals from 
the time they enter the program, how their income levels and quality of life changes while 
enrolled and how well they maintain those levels of income and quality of life after exiting the 
program. This approach, however, would be far too costly to deploy (Fiszbein et al. 2009), as 
exemplified by Opportunity NYC, the CCT program deployed in New York City based on 
Brazil’s Bolsa Família program. One of the aims of the program is to evaluate the effects of 
the conditional cash transfer by providing an experimental environment with a treatment and 
control group. However, though the program is widely regarded a success by researchers and 
beneficiaries, funding for the program’s evaluation and continued study has been 
discontinued, cited as being too costly (Aber 2012). 
Some improvements to the methods used by Fiszbein et al., merit suggestion, however. First, 
there exists some possible selection bias in his dataset that must be removed. His analysis 
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excludes data from Cambodia and Ecuador, which he dropped because he did not observe 
that the CCT program in those countries had an effect on the median consumption. From 
this he concludes that the program did not have an effect on poverty and therefore should not 
have been included in the study. It is possible that the variation in consumption was small 
enough to make it a statistically unlikely outlier, but even if the value was low enough to 
render unlikely a variation large enough to be statistically significant, it seems inappropriate 
to eliminate data sources simply because they had no effect on consumption when so many 
questions exist about consumption being a fair measure of poverty (Ravallion 1992; Ravallion, 
Chen, and Sangraula 2008; Fiszbein et al. 2009). If these assumptions turn out to be 
incorrect, the resulting analysis will skew to the side of programs that do have an impact, 
which, in the case of this study, would lead to inaccurate results in measuring the overall 
impact of CCT programs across Latin America. 
One way to eliminate this bias would be to include all countries within a relevant region, as 
this would measure them all under the same stick, so to speak. Furthermore, establishing a 
single index of poverty measure, whether uni-dimensional or multidimensional and applying it 
across all the countries in a region should eliminate the bias of studying impacts only on 
those groups the researcher can afford to reach. It would, unfortunately, be more costly to 
implement. 
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In the absence of this supposed panel data for participants and eligible non-participants, a 
different approach is to observe aggregate metrics over time and observe the effects on these 
metrics before and after the introduction of a CCT program in the country or region (World 
Bank 2012). In order to conclude that CCT programs alleviate poverty with direct cash 
transfers, my approach to establish program outcomes involves measuring both a decrease in 
the poverty rates for beneficiaries of the program while at the same time measuring no related 
change to the poverty rate for those not enrolled. Obviously, introducing a program where 
one of the two primary outcomes is the distribution of money to the poor will lower the 
general poverty rates. If distributing cash to those in need is all the program does, and if we 
control for the flux of beneficiaries within the programs, we would expect to see that once the 
initial drop in the poverty rate is felt from the enacted program benefits, we should be able to 
note a reduced but stable poverty rate. If, on the other hand, CCT programs have a 
sustainable long term effect on the poverty rate and the beneficiaries no longer enrolled tend 
to fare better than they would have without the benefits of the program vis-à-vis the human 
capital encouraged by the conditions of the program, then we should see the poverty rate 
continue to drop after the initial adjustment. 
In order to study the long-term potential of CCT programs with real data, my approach is to 
observe the rate of change in poverty rates before and after the implementation of a CCT 
program, one country at a time. If the rate of change in the poverty levels is significantly 
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more negative after the deployment of such programs, I can assert that something has 
changed that has not only lowered the levels of poverty, but that has fundamentally changed 
how poverty levels are reduced. If the rate of change in poverty levels gets lower each year at 
a statistically significant level, it is reasonable to conclude that net of other factors the 
contributing variable to the poverty reduction is sustainable for the foreseeable future. 
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3 Data & Methods 
As one of the oldest and largest CCT programs (Lindert et al. 2007; The Economist 2008), 
Brazil’s Bolsa Família provides plenty of data and as such, is a good starting point for an 
analysis of poverty rates. Deployed in 2003 by consolidating popular municipal-level programs 
from as far back as 1995, the program reaches over 11 million people, roughly a quarter of the 
country’s population. Its breadth and scope within the country provides a large sample size of 
subjects while its policies have remained relatively unchanged through three presidential 
administrations (MDS 2012). This history is in contrast to other country’s programs, such as 
Nicaragua’s RPS, which was discontinued in 2005 for what appeared to be a lack of support 
from the voting base and other political reasons, since funding was available for the program 
to continue after its lauded successes (Moore 2009). 
In this analysis I use data22 from the World Bank in conjunction with data from the Brazilian 
Ministry of Social Development (MDS) to examine the relationship between CCT programs 
and poverty levels. This data set provides the means to examine poverty in Brazil and in 
other countries — countries with and without CCT programs — in order to guide a 
                                     
22 These data include education, government health and general indicators related to poverty such as the number 
of children out of school, the primary education completion rate, gross domestic product, average consumer 
expenditure, infant mortality rate, life expectancy at birth, the number of children under five receiving DPT or 
measles immunizations, population growth rate and other measures of interest to studies of poverty (Attanasio 
et al. 2005; Attanasio et al. 2008; Attanasio and Mesnard 2006; François Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Leite 2003; 
Britto 2005; Cardoso and Souza 2004; Dollar and Kraay 2002; Fiszbein et al. 2009; Grosh et al. 2008; Schultz 
2004; UNDP 2009). 
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discussion concerning how CCT programs may be associated with fluctuations in poverty 
levels. 
World Bank Dataset 
The World Bank collects and makes available a wide-array of data from countries across the 
world, including poverty data. From these I have collected a pooled cross-sectional dataset of 
country-level indicators spanning from 1980 to 201123. While some of this data is consolidated 
from various studies of government agencies and non-governmental organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for 
Economic Coordination & Development (OECD) and others, much of it comes from its own 
research arms and national departments (World Bank 2012). For gathering poverty data — 
particularly data concerning income or consumption — the World Bank uses multi-topic 
surveys of income from a sample population selected using stratified random sampling. These 
surveys consider variability and time period of measurement, as well as cross-household price 
and consumption levels (World Bank 2012). 
The World Bank recognizes that some adjustments and updates are occasionally necessary in 
order to account for measurement discrepancies or missing values in its data (World Bank 
                                     
23 Though data is occasionally available as far back as the 1960’s, data for the indicators of interest in this study 
are only reliably available starting from about 1980. 
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Data 2012). Furthermore, time-series data for poverty are widely recognized as difficult to 
estimate and costly to collect through surveys year-after-year, in many cases not existing at 
all. The bank acknowledges that the data may contain other missing values from compilation 
errors and varying levels of data reporting practices across their sources, but allows users of 
the data to treat these sometimes randomly missing blanks as they believe to be appropriate 
(World Bank Data 2012). I discuss my methods for dealing with these missing values in the 
next section. 
Treatment of Data 
Since I intend to validate results from Brazil with that of other countries, I consider the 
World Bank dataset for all countries. In order to ensure accurate and reliable figures for the 
rates of change in the poverty headcount ratio and depth of poverty, I have taken several 
measures in treating the World Bank dataset. Countries with fewer than five observations for 
the poverty headcount ratio or the depth of poverty (FGT0 or FGT1, respectively) were 
dropped from the sample, as were countries with fewer than three of these observations for 
years following the year in which a CCT program was deployed. Furthermore, any variables 
with fewer than five total observations were not considered in the model. I tested variable 
relevance in the model using robust linear regressions, discarding statistically insignificant 
variables that did not contribute to the R2 or to the model of the endogenous variables in any 
other way. Of the commonly considered exogenous variables, I ran several OLS regressions for 
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Brazil and for different regional groupings of countries24. Throughout these analyses I 
observed which variables were most statistically significant in changing the poverty level and 
discarded the rest. 
Several data points were missing from the World Bank dataset, in some cases in large chunks.  
Guessing at these values and simply filling in the missing data, either with means, educated 
guesses or with the last known value in order to calculate rates of change would introduce 
either error, bias or both (Fan 2008; Honaker and King 2010). My objective was not 
necessarily to predict the true value of the missing elements, but rather to handle missing 
data as to enable valid statistical inference and facilitate log-difference analysis (Gelman et al. 
2004). As such, I considered using multiple imputation techniques to handle these data since 
it simulates values from a Bayesian posterior predictive distribution of the missing data25. 
However, using multiple imputation requires that the missing data be missing at random 
(Fan 2008; Rubin 1987), and while the specific reasons for the missing data are unknown, I 
cannot assert that funding issues, wars, natural disasters — i.e. non-random factors — did 
not affect the availability of data, and therefore cannot use multiple imputation to estimate 
                                     
24 These groupings include Latin America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, 
Southeast Asia, and West, North and Sub-Saharan Africa for countries with and without CCT programs. 
25 As such, multiple imputation is more flexible than fully parametric methods such as maximum-likelihood or 
purely Bayesian analysis, and more efficient than list-wise deletion, correcting for potential bias, accounting for 
missing-data uncertainty and thus avoiding the underestimation of variances of estimates (Honaker and King 
2010; Rubin 1996). 
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and analyze on the missing data (Marchenko 2009). Instead, the values can be estimated 
using linear interpolation. 
Though it is not a panel set, the cross-sectional data is a time series set. Data of this nature 
such as GDP, poverty and human capital tend to change relatively smoothly over time and if 
an observation in the middle of the series is missing, the true value will often not deviate far 
from a smooth trend plotted through the data (Honaker and King 2010). In samples with 
missing data that are not far apart from each other, linear interpolation is appropriate to 
smooth out these gaps, particularly for a log-difference analysis. While this method does not 
predict values beyond the last true observation, it does minimize the bias and inefficiency 
inherent in other methods (Junninen et al. 2004). 
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Data Description 
The endogenous variables in this study are the rates of change in the first two dimensions of 
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index of poverty, the headcount ratio and the depth of poverty, 
given by FGT0 and FGT1, respectively. The World Bank data shows that there exists a large 
range of values in both the headcount ratio as well as the depth of poverty, and that for 
Brazil, the mean rate of change of these variables is negative (Table 1). 
Table 1 — Summary Statistics of Poverty in Brazil 
 
Poverty level in Brazil 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Poverty Headcount Ratio 31 23.37 6.99 9.87 36.08 
Depth of Poverty 31 8.84 3.23 3.22 14.96 
Rate of Change in Poverty in Brazil 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Poverty Headcount Ratio 30 -0.03 0.11 -0.43 0.19 
Depth of Poverty 30 -0.64 0.06 -0.81 -0.51 
t statistics in parentheses — *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The summary data for the exogenous variables suggests that the population is growing at a 
mean rate of 1.6% (increasing the labor force by a mean rate of 2.7% per year). Meanwhile, 
public expenditure on education, consumer expenditure, GDP and GDP per capita are all 
increasing. Inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient, on the other hand is decreasing, as 
is infant mortality. Other metrics of note concerning the poverty levels and the building of 
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human capital are on the rise such as the completion rate of primary school26 and infant 
immunization rates27. 
Table 2 — Summary Statistics of Exogenous Variables 
 
Exogenous Variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Avg Δ 
Population Growth (%) 31 1.60 0.45 0.88 2.34 -0.03200 
Consumer Exp. (Billions of US$) 31 530 302 200 1,210 0.06298 
GDP (Billions of US$ PPP) 31 1,090 494 454 2,190 0.05288 
GDP per Capita (US$ PPP) 31 6,466 2,107 3,644 11,210 0.03650 
Gini Coefficient 31 58.12 2.12 53.90 62.99 -0.00197 
Labor Force (Millions of People) 30 73.3 17.1 46.4 101.0 0.02731 
Primary School Completion Rate 32 91.79 13.62 72.04 112.12 0.01351 
Infant DPT Immunization Rate 31 78.23 18.53 37.00 99.00 0.03657 
Infant Measles Immunization Rate 31 84.39 14.87 57.00 99.00 0.02298 
Infant Mortality 31 41.63 16.75 17.30 73.60 -0.04707 
t statistics in parentheses — *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
  
                                     
26 The duration of primary school varies between countries in this study, with a range of 3 to 8 years, and an 
average of 5.4. Brazil’s primary school system was 4 years long during the time period from 1980 to 2011. 
27 I elect to use the DPT and Measles immunization rate indicators for children under five as the measures of 
preventive health in this study. Most countries had very complete records of these two indicators and because 
these diseases are prevalent around the world there exists no bias for region. 
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Method 
The primary objective in this analysis is to assert whether the CCT program in Brazil can be 
associated with an ongoing decrease in the rate of change in poverty. By running a time-series 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the difference-in-differences of the poverty levels in 
Brazil, I observe fluctuations in the rate of change in poverty levels during different stages of 
the Bolsa Família CCT program, accounting for GDP and the Gini Coefficient28. These 
difference-in-differences are obtained by measuring the differences between the values in time 
t and time t-1, and then running a linear regression on these values. In empirical economics, 
this difference-in-differences analysis is a common means of testing whether the rate of change 
in an estimator — sometimes called an average treatment effect — is statistically significant 
(Wooldridge 2009, 451). While I observe education and health indicators, I ignore them in the 
analysis29, keeping my focus on measuring the poverty figures themselves. The longer the 
program progresses in Brazil, I expect a larger magnitude negative trend in the rates of 
change of poverty levels. 
Furthermore, as a means to support the primary analysis of the program in Brazil, I perform 
a similar analysis of poverty in Mexico as well as other countries in Latin America and the 
                                     
28 These factors are discussed in the next section. 
29 I do not consider these exogenous factors, but rather indicators that are quite interrelated with the rate of 
change in poverty levels. 
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Caribbean30. I also perform the analysis on countries with and without CCT programs 
aggregated by region in order to compare and validate the observations in Brazil. This 
aggregation is achieved by collapsing the difference-in-differences of poverty levels for 
countries with CCT programs into their medians. I use medians instead of means because 
there were some notable spikes in the rate of change in poverty levels for some countries that 
could have resulted in regression analyses skewed towards increases in poverty levels. 
Argentina, for example, experienced an economic collapse at the turn of the millennium, when 
its poverty headcount ratio soared from 8.9% in 2001 to 19.7% in 2002. The data further 
shows that other countries, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, experienced 
similar spikes and outlying fluctuations31. The sample distribution of the resulting data is 
such that the only countries with CCT programs left in the sample with viable data are in 
Latin America. 
Though a spike in the income of the poor is expected to trigger a decrease in the levels of 
poverty metrics immediately after the deployment of a CCT program, I do not expect to see 
much improvement in the rates of change of these poverty levels in the earliest phase after 
                                     
30 Mexico is a fair comparison to Brazil in this case because the Mexican CCT program, Oportunidades, reaches 
a similar proportion of the population and is at least as well regarded as Bolsa Família in terms of successful 
outcomes (Freije et al. 2006). 
31 A sample of these includes Poland from 1993 to 1996, Moldova from 1998 to 2001, Macedonia in 2000 and 
Belarus from 1996 to 1997. 
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the implementation. However, I do expect that after some time32 a stable program will have 
had enough people leaving the program and re-entering society as non-beneficiaries that the 
effects the program has had on these people should begin to be measured as evidenced by the 
rate of change in the poverty levels. 
In order to examine whether the rates of change in Brazil’s poverty metrics are different 
before and after the implementation of Bolsa Família, I use splines to isolate rates of change 
in the poverty levels before the implementation of the CCT program two years after the 
deployment and everything thereafter (Wooldridge 2009). The splines in this case represent 
the regression line isolated between two points in time. Instead of analyzing the regression 
between 1980 and 2011, for example, which would include the distortion in the rate of change 
before and after the implementation of Bolsa Família, I can observe the regression line from 
1980 to 2003, from 2003 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2011. This method isolates the rate of 
change in poverty levels before the program’s deployment from the rate of change after it. 
Exogenous Factors 
At the World Economic Forum in 2000, Bill Clinton was unambiguous in his assertion that 
open markets are the best engines to raise standards of living (Dollar and Kraay 2002). In 
                                     
32 For this study I make the assumption that three years is enough time to begin seeing in some subjects the 
kind of effects expected in the long-term. 
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this context, growth and inequality33 are well-known correlates of poverty, but as the data in 
Brazil shows (Table 3), no single factor predicts poverty levels better than real GDP. 
Table 3 — GDP and Gini Coefficient as Predictors 
 
OLS Regression Models for predicting Poverty Headcount Ratio in Brazil34 
 Full Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Rate of Change in GDP -1.836*** -1.609***    (-4.76) (-3.90)    
Rate of Change in the 
Gini Coefficient 
2.532*  0.844   
(2.68)  (0.79)   
GDP -0.000000338   -0.000000296*  (-1.97)   (-2.07)  
Gini Coefficient -0.0213    0.0120 (-1.46)    (0.82) 
Year 0.0115 -0.00487** -0.00361 0.0114 -0.00240 
(1.47) (-2.93) (-1.44) (1.36) (-0.70) 
OLS Regression Models for predicting Depth of Poverty in Brazil35 
 Full Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Rate of Change in GDP 
-2.156** -1.808**    
(-3.54) (-3.24)    
Rate of Change in the 
Gini Coefficient 
2.870  0.901   
(1.78)  (0.57)   
GDP -0.000000306   -0.000000252  (-1.17)   (-1.57)  
Gini Coefficient -0.0256    0.00911 (-1.16)    (0.49) 
Year 0.00841 -0.00578* -0.00439 0.00822 -0.00367 (0.67) (-2.28) (-1.38) (0.75) (-0.78) 
N 28 28 28 28 28 
t statistics in parentheses — *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
                                     
33 The Gini coefficient is a common metric for the index of inequality in a country, and is given in either ratios 
or whole numbers. The higher the number, the more unequally distributed is the wealth in the country. Brazil’s 
Gini coefficient has been one of the highest in the world at .583 while countries like the US, the UK and 
Germany have typically hovered around the upper 30’s (Herrera 2012). 
34 Models 1 – 4 are shown to isolate the effects of using one factor at a time (in conjunction with time). 
35 Idem. 
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By using a full model next to partial models for the individual factors, I can observe the 
difference in effects of each individual factor both ignoring other factors as well as net of 
them. Compared to GDP, the Gini coefficient and their respective rates of change, a 
regression analysis shows that the rate of change of GDP is a statistically significant predictor 
of both FGT0 and FGT1. Neither the Gini coefficient nor its rate of change predicts poverty 
with any statistical significance, but where an increase of $1,000 in GDP predicts a 
statistically insignificant drop in the FGT0 by .000000338% and a drop of .000000306% in 
FGT1, an increase of 1% in the rate of change in GDP predicts a decrease of 1.836% in FGT0 
and 2.156% in FGT1. Other factors in the dataset such as population, population growth, 
population density, democratic index, measures of press freedom, tax rates and percent of 
GDP spent on health or education are correlated and may be contributors, but none predict 
poverty levels better than their means with any statistical significance. Other potential 
factors, such as labor force participation rate or GDP per capita are omitted in favor of GDP 
due to the expected distortions in these variables by the very cash transfer and human capital 
construction components inherent in CCT programs.  
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4 Observations 
Bolsa Família was consolidated in 2003 from Bolsa Escola, Auxílio Gás and Cartão 
Alimentação36, which were municipal CCT programs in effect throughout Brazil since 1995 
(MDS 2012). Following a period of wild fluctuations in the rate of change in poverty metrics, 
in 1995 both poverty level indicators stabilized for approximately ten years. This coincides 
with a transition period in Brazil after the implementation of a new currency and during 
which these various other small anti-poverty programs were beginning to gain traction among 
the population (Caixa Economica Federal 2012). In the mid-2000’s, approximately around the 
time when CCT programs in Brazil were consolidated and expanded nationally with the 
creation of Bolsa Família, both measures of poverty levels decreased drastically. Less than a 
decade later, Brazil had roughly halved the percentage of its population living below the 
purchasing power parity of $2 a day as well as the depth of poverty within the country. 
There is no question that levels of poverty as measured by the headcount ratio and the depth 
of poverty decreased steadily throughout the 80’s and 90’s. My analysis shows the decrease in 
poverty levels in Brazil align closely with that of other countries, a seemingly global decrease 
widely believed to be the result of the boom in economic growth many countries experienced 
in the 20th century (Dollar and Kraay 2002; Mankiw 2010; Herrera 2012). 
                                     
36 Bolsa Escola, or School Grants was essentially Bolsa Família without the vaccination requirement. Auxílio 
Gás, or Auxiliary Gas, provided aid to families struggling to pay for stove propane. Cartão Alimentação, or 
Nutrition Card, provided families with nutritional aid (MDS 2012). 
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Because large increases in income are usually associated with increases in inequality 
(Gastwirth 1972), it is not unexpected that the income distribution of most countries shifted 
upward during this time (Figure 3). Nor is it surprising that while aggregate income increased 
during this time, much of the population rose up and out of poverty37 (Herrera 2012). As one 
of the so-called BRIC38 countries, Brazil experienced massive economic growth during this 
time, and so it is also not surprising to see a significant decrease in the levels of poverty 
during this economic boom. Net of GDP and the Gini coefficient39, the poverty headcount 
ratio alone dropped from over 35% to levels below 10% in the last 25 years while the depth of 
poverty (the poverty gap) dropped from 15% at its highest levels in the early 80’s to under 
5% in 2010 (Figures 4 & 5). 
                                     
37 …while making a smaller proportion of the population that much richer. 
38 Brazil, Russia, India, China, the explosively emerging economies in the world (O’Neill and Goldman 2001). 
39 The two factors are correlated with a measure of .25, which is insignificant enough to consider both in the 
analysis (Wooldridge 2009). 
Figure 3 — Economic Growth in the 
20th Century (Herrera 2012) 
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OLS of Poverty Metrics in Brazil 
 Headcount Ratio (FGT0) Depth of Poverty (FGT1) 
GDP -0.0000159*** (-3.88) -0.00000443* (-2.76) 
Gini Coefficient -0.143 (-0.42) -0.00440 (-0.03) 
Year 0.0984 (0.52) -0.106 (-1.33) 
N 29 29 
t statistics in parentheses — *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 4 — Regressing Poverty Levels in Brazil 
An important question to ask at this point is whether the rate of change in these poverty 
levels has changed and if so, whether it is different in the periods of time before and after the 
implementation of the CCT program, Bolsa Família. By comparing the rates of change of 
poverty level indicators in other countries — both with and without CCT programs — I test 
the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the rate of change in the poverty levels 
of a country with and a country without a CCT program. 
(Vertical red lines indicate the implementation of the CCT 
program) 
Figures 4 & 5 — Poverty Levels in Brazil 
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Naïve Analysis 
Figure 6 & 7 — Rates of Change in Poverty Levels in Brazil 
  
A glance at the rates of change in the poverty levels of Brazil shows that although the rate of 
change in poverty levels is highly volatile from year to year, the overall trend has a slope 
close to zero (Figures 6 & 7). The rate of change in the poverty headcount ratio in Brazil 
typically fluctuated between three and four percentage points in the mid eighties, as did the 
rate of change in the depth of poverty. During this time, however, it tended to fluctuate 
equally in magnitude above and below zero, resulting in a mean rate of change close to zero. 
The same analysis for the depth of poverty shows a similar pattern. Given these apparent 
trends in Brazil, it is of interest to examine these trends in the context of other Latin 
American countries (with and without CCT programs). 
An analysis on the trends of the rates of change in poverty metrics between Brazil, Latin 
American countries with CCT programs and Latin American countries without CCT 
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programs shows that the rate of change in poverty levels across countries with CCT programs 
in Latin America decreases roughly twice as fast as the trend for Brazil (Figures 8 & 9). The 
slope on this trend is -.0087 compared to -.0042, and it is certainly faster than Latin 
American countries without a CCT program40. 
Figure 8 & 9 — Trends on Rate of Change in Poverty Levels 
 
Naïve Robust OLS Regression on the Log-Differences of the Poverty Headcount Ratio in Brazil 
 Brazil Latin American CCT Programs Latin American Non-CCT Programs 
Year 
-0.00423* -0.00866*** -0.00243 
(-2.06) (-5.66) (-1.74) 
N 28 189 119 
Naïve Robust OLS Regression on the Log-Differences of the Depth of Poverty in Brazil 
 Brazil Latin American CCT Programs Latin American Non-CCT Programs 
Year -0.00505 -0.00956*** -0.00393 
(-1.75) (-4.62) (-1.86) 
N 28 189 119 
t statistics in parentheses — *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Table 5 — Naïve Regressions on Log-Differences of Poverty in Brazil 
                                     
40 Though the rate of change in the poverty headcount ratio for Latin American countries without CCT 
programs is roughly half of Brazil’s rate of change (-.0024 compared to -.0042), it is not statistically significant. 
Ávila — An Analysis of CCT Programs & Poverty 
 45 
The regression shows that there exists a significant difference over time in the rate of change 
of both poverty metrics in Brazil and in countries with CCT programs, whereas the same 
cannot be said for countries without CCT programs (Table 5). While these results provide 
encouraging evidence that CCT programs may be associated with decreases in poverty, the 
tests neither control for exogenous variables, nor do they account for the differences in the 
slope of the trend lines before and after the program, which the next phase of the analysis will 
examine. 
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5 Analysis & Discussion 
The final model is an OLS regression of the rate of change in poverty levels. It controls for 
GDP — which I have shown to be the most statistically significant factor in poverty 
reduction — as well as inequality and the stage of the CCT program41. By including dummy 
variables for each CCT stage in the model I observe how the rates of change in poverty differ 
at each stage of CCT program net of the other factors (Equation 1). 
Equation 1 — OLS Model for Rates of Change in FGT 
𝐹𝐺𝑇! = .0760 − 1.715 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃∆ + 1.902 ∙ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖∆ − .0093 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! − .0568 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! − .0415 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! 𝐹𝐺𝑇! = .0881 − 1.965 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃∆ + 2.191 ∙ 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖∆ − .0366 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! − .0028 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! − .0796 ∙ 𝑃ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒! 
Brazil 
A difference-in-differences analysis of the levels of poverty in Brazil from 1980 to 2011 (Table 
6) reveals that prior to 2003, when Bolsa Família was consolidated from other CCT programs 
in Brazil, the mean rate of change in poverty had been reasonably stable. Net of GDP, the 
Gini coefficient and the other stages, the log difference of the poverty headcount ratio (which 
represents the slope of the rate of change)42 dropped steadily by a statistically insignificant -
                                     
41 I’ve modeled the stages as Before CCT Program Deployment, Phase 1 (first two years) and Phase 2 (after two 
years). 
42 Also known as the log difference, or the rate of change. Taking logs of variables with wide ranges such as 
population or school enrollment narrows the range of the variable, in some cases by a considerable amount, 
making estimates less sensitive to outlying observations on the variables. Variables that are proportion or a 
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.0093 over the course of the two decades preceding the implementation of the program. 
Although the graph shows much fluctuation in the metrics (particularly during the early 
nineties) the effective average annual rate of change before 2003 was extremely small, and the 
difference between the mean rate of change during this time period and the slope of the line 
from the OLS model predicting the rate of change was not statistically significant. 
Table 6 — OLS Model of Log-Differences of Poverty in Brazil 
OLS Model of CCT Programs and Poverty Metrics in Brazil 
 Poverty Headcount Ratio Depth of Poverty 
Rate of Change of GDP -1.715*** (-3.84) -1.965** (-3.01) 
Rate of Change in Gini Coefficient 1.902 (1.87) 2.191 (1.34) 
Before CCT Program -0.00934 (-0.16) -0.0366 (-0.35) 
Immediately After CCT Program -0.0568 (-1.06) -0.00281 (-0.03) 
Intermediate Phases of CCT Program -0.0415 (-1.33) -0.0796* (-2.65) 
intercept 0.0760** (2.90) 0.0881* (2.21) 
N 28 28 
t statistics in parentheses — *p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
After 2003, net of GDP and the Gini coefficient, the rate of change in poverty levels in Brazil 
begins to fall. In the first two years after the deployment of Bolsa Família, the rate of change 
falls by more than six times to -.0568 for the poverty headcount ratio. In these first two years 
after deployment, the rate of change in the depth of poverty did not fall, and in fact seems to 
have increased from -.0366 to -.00281. After the first two years, however, the rate of change 
in the poverty headcount ratio increased slightly, though it continued to be lower than before 
the program was implemented by a factor close to 4.5. The rate of change in the depth of 
                                                                                                                           
percentage (unemployment, poverty headcount ratio, etc.) are usually seen in level forms because any regression 
coefficients involving the original variable will have a percentage point change interpretation (Wooldridge 2009). 
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poverty during this time fell dramatically to -.0796, more than twice what it had been before 
the program existed, and at a statistically significant p-value less than .05. 
 
Figures 10 & 11 — Splined Rates of Change in FGT0 and FGT1 in Brazil 
 
(Vertical red lines indicate the 
implementation of the CCT program) 
(Vertical red lines indicate the 
implementation of the CCT program) 
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The change is stark, and can be more easily understood visually by graphing the rate of 
change in poverty levels over time using a spline for each stage (Figures 10 & 11). The 
outcome is further illustrated by observing the trend for GDP at the same time. As the rates 
of change of both measures of poverty experience steep declines in the years immediately 
following the deployment of the CCT program, the GDP continues to grow at the same rate. 
The apparent fluctuation in the rate of change of poverty levels is dramatic, and so seemingly 
aligned with the CCT program’s start date that any skeptic should want to observe these 
trends in other countries. 
Other Countries 
In Mexico, where the Progresa CCT program was implemented in 1997 and later nationalized 
into Oportunidades in 2002, the trend on the rate of change in poverty levels follows similar 
patterns, falling abruptly at the onset of the program (Figure 12). 
Though still negative (and still less than 
it was before the implementation of the 
program), Mexico’s rate of change 
increased in the three years immediately 
following the program’s deployment in 
1997. It dropped again in 2002 when the 
Figure 12 — Splined Rate of Change in FGT0 in Mexico 
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program was nationalized, but began increasing rapidly after that, almost reaching the levels 
at which it had been prior to the implementation of Progresa. 
Chile’s CCT program seems to have 
met with similar results (Figure 13). 
The rate of change in poverty levels 
dropped dramatically after the 
deployment of the program in 2002, but 
while they remained negative, and well 
below their original levels before the 
program’s implementation, there was an increasing trend in the two to three years after the 
program’s deployment. The depth of poverty looked similar, as it has in other analyses. 
In the Caribbean, Jamaica’s rate of 
change in poverty levels mostly agrees 
with the experience of the other countries 
in Latin America (Figure 14). In 
Jamaica’s case, it took roughly two years 
to begin seeing any results at all from the 
CCT program. Though the rate of change 
was already negative at the time the program was deployed, it increased slightly in the first 
Figure 13 — Splined Rate of Change in FGT0 in Chile 
Figure 14 — Splined Rate of Change in FGT0 in Jamaica 
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two years, following which, there was a sharp decline in the rate of change of poverty levels. 
No upward swing has been detected since the program’s implementation. 
It is possible that some latent characteristic of Jamaica is different from these other countries, 
or that some aspect of the Caribbean is 
different from Latin America in such a 
way as to exhibit the delayed fluctuation 
observed in Jamaica’s data. Aggregating 
country-level data by region shows how 
the results I’ve discussed from countries 
with CCT programs is not unusual (Figure 
15). 
Figures 16 & 17 — Splined Aggregate Rates of Change in FGT0 
for countries without CCT Programs (Asia & Latin America) 
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Compared to countries with CCT programs across the world, countries without CCT 
programs show a very different trend. While Latin American and Southeast Asian countries 
without CCT programs (Figures 16 & 17) exhibit decreasing rates of change in poverty levels, 
their fluctuations are not as drastic. In countries without CCT programs in various parts of 
Africa, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East, trends are even less 
obvious or suggestive of an event-based fluctuation (Figures 18, 19, 20 & 21). 
Figures 18, 19, 20 & 21 — Splined Aggregate Rates of Change in FGT0 for countries 
without CCT Programs (West Africa, Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East) 
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Discussion 
The data I have established shows that the result observed in Brazil is not an outlier as 
similar trends are observed in other Latin American countries with CCT programs, as well as 
the Jamaican program in the Caribbean. Specifically, the data shows that the rates of change 
in poverty levels in countries that implement CCT programs exhibit similar fluctuation 
patterns after the deployment of the programs. Furthermore, it shows that while these 
countries exhibit similar fluctuations to countries without CCT programs before their 
deployment, the fluctuations observed thereafter are quite different from countries that have 
not deployed CCT programs. 
What this analysis shows is that the rate of change in the poverty headcount ratio and the 
depth of poverty exhibits a measurable decline after the deployment of the Bolsa Família 
CCT program in 2003 (the rate of change in the depth of poverty by a statistically significant 
amount). That the other values are lower but statistically insignificant is not surprising at 
this point, given the program’s age. Even as the most developed of these programs, Bolsa 
Família is still less than a decade on in its development and only a relative handful of people 
will have left the program and attempted to face the world with their new levels of human 
capital. In the coming years, changes in the job market that reflect the new levels of human 
capital will be most telling. 
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As the country continues to grow and develop, there will be opportunities to observe how it 
adapts to the reality of a population that has been too poor in the past to help itself up but 
will now be able to study and work their way out of poverty and contribute to the direction 
of the country’s economy. If the trend continues there will be a shift in the demographics of 
the population, with more people available and capable of performing jobs previously out of 
their scope or reach. This change in the labor force will likely only be one of many facing the 
Brazilian economy, but observing these changes in particular should provide an interesting 
perspective on the effects of CCT programs. 
Issues & Limitations 
Several CCT studies have mentioned the nascent quality of the data as an area of concern 
(Oliveira et al. 2007; Fiszbein et al. 2009; Freije et al. 2006), and with reason. Many countries 
have only recently implemented CCT programs, and data were derived from either the pilot 
stages of these programs or from the early phases of the implementations (Fiszbein et al. 
2009). Because their effects (if any are present) need time to manifest, I cannot necessarily 
expect to observe these effects clearly or conclusively so soon after implementation. However, 
with a few CCT programs at the time of this writing above the dozen year mark, and many 
approaching a decade, data available from the field is more cured than it has previously been, 
and even a couple of years can make a difference. Whereas Oliveira considered her two-year 
time-span to be too short to yield conclusive analysis, McKee performs a thorough analysis on 
Ávila — An Analysis of CCT Programs & Poverty 
 55 
data across a five-year span (McKee and Todd 2011). In a similar example based on data 
from 2007, a study by the ILO claimed that attempts to isolate the effects of the cash 
transfer on the aggregated household consumption level had not been successful (ILO 2009). 
Just two years later in 2009, however, Fiszbein et al. rather confidently used cumulative 
consumption data to isolate the effects of CCT programs on short-term poverty relief 
(Fiszbein et al. 2009). Because several CCT programs have, however, been in non-pilot 
operation for approximately a decade at the time of this writing, I expect data maturity will 
not be as relevant a concern as it has been in the past. 
As in any observational study, data quality may come into question (Singleton and Straits 
2010; World Bank 2012). When data is compiled from various sources43 (however reliable 
those sources may be), this data inexorably lends itself to noise such as missing values or 
unknown biases. Unfortunately, the scope of this study does not include gathering complete 
data from all possible agencies that may have gathered them at some point, nor does it allow 
for the resources necessary to question the validity of the data-gathering processes used by 
such a broad class of potential data agents. In order to avoid criticism in this area, I keep my 
observations and analyses to the level of the data, and ask that the reader take my 
conclusions only as far as the data can be considered. 
                                     
43 As I’ve mentioned, the World Bank data in this study is a consolidation of several databases, including other 
NGOs such as the UN, the IMF, the FAO, the OECD and others. 
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Lastly, because the environments in which CCT programs are deployed differ across the 
world, it is difficult to generalize the success or failure of one to that of another (Ravallion et 
al. 1991). Other political and cultural environments, for example, may have different 
influences on the outcome of a CCT program. In the analysis of poverty in Brazil, I 
attempted to control for the size and reach of the programs based on the aggregate number of 
people who received benefits and how much money the programs distributed. However, this 
data was not readily available for other countries, meaning that their analyses cannot control 
for these factors. Because I wish to compare the results of the analysis in Brazil to those in 
other countries, I choose to conduct the analysis ignoring program size and reach. In light of 
this, I have kept my conclusion focused on the outcome of a CCT program based on the rate 
of change in poverty levels over time in order to assert how well the model fares across the 
world. Future studies can advance this evaluation method by controlling for size and reach 
within all countries with CCT programs. 
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6 Conclusion 
Although poverty levels in Brazil have been in steady decline over time, I have observed a 
statistically significant decrease in the rate of change in poverty levels in Brazil following the 
deployment of the Bolsa Família CCT program. If the trend continues, the levels of poverty 
in the country as measured by both the percentage of people living below the poverty line as 
well as how deeply below the poverty line that percentage goes, it looks promisingly likely 
that the programs will be an asset in combating poverty in the long run. Furthermore, the 
short-term alleviation the program provides coupled with the improved social welfare metrics 
observed in other studies should provide increasing demand-side pressure for increased 
spending in the areas demanded including education and health care. 
Many other studies have measured the ability of CCT programs to improve social welfare 
indicators for human capital development, and the literature shows a clear connection 
between CCT programs and improvements in education, health and consumption metrics. 
While some CCT programs have seemingly improved the situations in their respective 
environments, other studies have provided little conclusive evidence to show that the 
program’s long-term objectives can be met based on the available trends in poverty. By 
directly evaluating the rates of change in the levels of poverty, this study has provided more 
evidence that the long-term objectives of CCT programs are being met. 
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It has been my aim in this study to assert whether CCT programs can be associated with a 
decrease in the rates of change of poverty levels as measured explicitly by poverty metrics in 
order to assess whether CCT programs can fulfill their objective of decreasing poverty in the 
long run. By demonstrating this association in the Bolsa Família program in Brazil, as well as 
other countries and countries with CCT programs in general, I hope to lay the groundwork 
for other studies that can establish causal connections between CCT programs, increases in 
human capital and the reduction of poverty in the long term. A better understanding of this 
relationship will provide leaders and policy-makers with the knowledge to better formulate 
best practices for implementing successful CCT programs across various political, social and 
economic landscapes and ultimately determine whether CCT programs will become the cost-
effective instrument of choice in the toolbox of policy makers, or if they will fade into history 
as a passing fad of the early millennium. 
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8 Appendix 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke Index of Poverty 
The following definitions and assertions are taken from the seminal paper defining this metric 
(Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke 1984). 
FGT0 — The headcount index is given by the general FGT form with α=0, which reduces 
FGT0 to 
!!. This figure measures the proportion of a population that is considered poor based 
on a selected poverty line44. This measure is common because it is easy to understand and 
measure. The measure does not, however, indicate the extent or depth of poverty. 
FGT1 — The poverty gap index is given by the general FGT form with α=1, reducing it to 𝐹𝐺𝑇! = !! ∙ (!!!!! )!!!! , and measures the extent to which people fall below the poverty line. 
The sum of these gaps gives the minimum cost of eliminating poverty if transfers were 
perfectly targeted. The measure does not, however, reflect changes in inequality among the 
poor. 
FGT2 — The poverty severity index is given by the general FGT form with α=2, which 
averages the squares of the gaps relative to the poverty line. 
                                     
44 In this study I focus on a PPP $2/day poverty line, as it is more relevant to lower-middle income countries. 
Figure 15 — Splined Aggregate Rate of Change in 
FGT0 in Latin America 
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FGTSST — An aggregate of the three FGT metrics, the Sen-Shorrocks-Thon metric is given 
by 𝐹𝐺𝑇!!" = 𝐹𝐺𝑇! ∙ 𝐹𝐺𝑇!!(1+ 𝐺!), where FGT0 is the headcount index, FGT1 is the poverty 
gap index only for the poor population, and GP is the Gini index for poverty gaps for the 
population. It gives a single number that can be broken down to assert relative measures in 
the number of poor, the depth of their poverty and the level of inequality among them. 
 
